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Vote-buying and voter intimidation are costly, complicated, and risky ways to manage elections. Why,
then, do hybrid regimes utilize such tactics rather than ballot stuffing or election falsification? Such
methods to mobilize voters require the construction of patronage networks that can be used to mobilize
or demobilize clients beyond the election, and to display the incumbent's organizational strength. These
networks are most valuable in places where opposition groups are active; consequently direct voter
pressure should be more common in competitive areas. This paper uses data from Russia's 83 regions
during the 2011 election to compare patterns of extra-legal mobilization with patterns of ballot stuffing
and falsification. I conclude that local political competitiveness structures the mix of electoral manipu-
lation tactics employed.
© 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.1. Introduction: extra-legal mobilization and hybrid regimes
Why do hybrid regimes engage in vote-buying and other
methods of directly pressuring voters, when they have a number of
other tools with which to manipulate elections? Such extra-legal
mobilization efforts require the development of networks that
link patrons, brokers, and voters; brokers and voters must be
monitored to ensure they do not defect. As a result of the size of
these networks and the principal-agent problems inherent in them,
extra-legal mobilization efforts are costly, complicated, inefficient,
and risky. Why is it that governments in hybrid regimes do not
forego extra-legal mobilization, and devote those resources to more
efficient forms of social control? I argue that this puzzle, which has
not been fully addressed in the literature on authoritarian elections
or election manipulation, can be resolved by understanding that
the costs and benefits of electoral manipulation vary by the tactic
used. Incumbents take advantage of these costs and benefits by
adjusting the mix of tactics they employ in response to local po-
litical conditions. Like other forms of manipulation, extra-legal
mobilization helps improve the incumbent's vote-share in the
election. However, it also has additional benefits that are most
valuable in competitive conditions.Extra-legal mobilization requires a network of patronage that
can be used to mobilize or demobilize clients. Deploying these
networks to influence voters sends a signal of the incumbent's
organizational strength and resources to other political actors. Due
to these two indirect benefits, extra-legal mobilization is most
valuable to incumbents where the risk of oppositionmobilization is
highest, since these networks and signals can be used to counteract
opposition activity. It is difficult to test this theory directly using
measures of opposition activity, since the theory predicts that
extra-legal mobilization is both a response to, and deterrent of,
opposition action. Instead, I test the theory by 1) adapting existing
methods of election forensics to estimate three types of electoral
manipulation: falsification of results, ballot stuffing, and extra-legal
mobilization, and 2) demonstrating that use of these tactics varies
in response to indicators of political competitiveness. I apply these
methods to electoral results from Russia's 83 regions during the
2011 parliamentary election. I find that local political competi-
tiveness structures the mix of tactics used to manipulate the elec-
tion: falsification occurs primarily in the least competitive regions,
ballot stuffing is equally common at middle and high levels of
competitiveness, and extra-legal mobilization becomes increas-
ingly common as competitiveness increases.
This paper contributes to a growing literature on the politics of
electoral authoritarian (or hybrid) regimes. Research in this tradi-
tion has made great progress in demonstrating the functions that
1 This risk also increases the cost of falsification and ballot stuffing. In Russia, for
example, half of regional commission members are appointed by the regional
legislature (‘On the Guarantees… ’ Article 23). A larger delegation in the legislature
for opposition parties can thus translate into a less supportive commission.
2 It can have a variety of goals, as well. Gans-Morse et al. (2014) identify four
types of electoral clientelism, based on who is targeted: vote-buying, turnout-
buying, abstention-buying, and double-persuasion.
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can play in sustaining authoritarian governments. Multi-party
elections allow authoritarian rulers to co-opt the opposition
(Gandhi and Przeworski, 2007; Gandhi, 2008), to channel their
demands into the structured setting of the legislature (Gandhi and
Przeworski, 2006), to gather information (Boix and Svolik, 2013), or
to deter elite defections (Magaloni, 2006). Elections and ruling
parties can be a means of binding together elites and managing
elite disagreements (Brownlee, 2007; Blaydes, 2011). In short,
electoral competition serves as a mechanism whereby authori-
tarian rulers distribute patronage resources and policy influence to
those lower-level politicians who demonstrate loyalty and effec-
tiveness at managing elections (Lust-Okar, 2006; Malesky and
Schuler, 2010; Reuter and Robertson, 2012).
Elections have been shown to be stabilizing for authoritarian
regimes in most cases, but they still pose risks. They provide an
opportunity for opposition groupsdboth domestic and inter-
nationaldto organize and mobilize against the regime (Bunce and
Wolchik, 2010; Donno, 2013; Lindberg, 2009), and can also trigger
mass protest, as the so-called color revolutions demonstrate (Tucker,
2007). Compared to the literature on hybrid institutions, we know
less about the means by which governments in hybrid regimes
manage elections in order to avoid these undesirable outcomes. This
article contributes to our understanding by demonstrating that pro-
regime actors in a hybrid regime vary the tactics they use to
manipulate elections across the territory of the regime, in response
to the capacity of the opposition to mobilize its own supporters.
2. Theory: extra-legal mobilization and (de)mobilizing
patronage networks
Authoritarian leaders have a variety of tools at their disposal
with which to manage elections. These can range from pre-election
limitations on the opposition to post-election nullification of the
results (Schedler, 2002). One option authoritarian governments
have on election day is extra-legal mobilization, which I define as
an attempt to pressure actual voters to support a party or candidate
through benefits (such as a cash payment) or sanctions (such as the
threat of job loss). This project seeks to understand the conditions
under which governments engage in extra-legal mobilization
rather than rely on other tools like falsification of the vote count or
ballot stuffing. In particular, it addresses a puzzle that has gone thus
far gone unanswered in the literature on election fraud in author-
itarian countries. Extra-legal mobilization efforts are costly, as they
require a network of brokers to identify potential opponents and
supporters, disburse payments, and monitor compliance. Authori-
tarian election managers have been shown to change manipulation
strategies with relative ease, manipulating the vote count when
methods like ballot-stuffing are too easily observed (Sjoberg, 2013).
Why then do authoritarian governments engage in costly, ineffi-
cient efforts to mobilize voters through intimidation and vote-
buying when they have the capacity to manipulate election re-
sults more directly?
In the following paragraphs I will show that extra-legal mobi-
lization is costly and suffers from drawbacks that falsification and
ballot stuffing do not. As a result, I argue that extra-legal mobili-
zation should be employed where its indirect, non-electoral ben-
efits are most valuable. Extra-legal mobilization requires the
construction and display of patronage networks that could be used
to mobilize or demobilize clients when necessary, such as in the
event of opposition protest. Extra-legal mobilization can also send
signals to other political actors about the incumbent regime's re-
sources, helping induce cooperation. I hypothesize that these two
benefits increase in value as the ability of opposition groups to
organize increases, and as a result extra-legal mobilization effortsshould be more common and intensive in competitive regions.1
2.1. Cost of extra-legal mobilization vs. election fraud and ballot
stuffing
Extra-legal mobilization can encompass a variety of different
means of influencing voters.2 Political machines can make direct
payments to voters (Stokes, 2005; Nichter, 2008), pressure em-
ployers to ensure their employees vote for the ruling party (Frye
et al., 2014), and more. In any case, voters must be rewarded for
voting correctly. Consequently, extra-legal mobilization of any kind
requires the development of networks that allow patrons tomonitor
clients, and to transfer rewards and punishments. These networks
are usually mediated by one ormore levels of brokers, with actors at
each level responsible for overseeing a larger number of actors at the
next level down (Knoke, 1990; Lazar, 2007; Auyero, 2007; Holzner,
2007). These pyramidal networks are inherently vulnerable to
principal-agent problems (Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007).
The resulting networks are complex, costly and inefficient. At
every level of the pyramidal network linking patrons and clients,
brokers must be deterred from diverting resources for their own
private gain and clients must be monitored (Kitschelt and
Wilkinson, 2007). One study of vote-buying in a district election
in Taiwan found that at least 45% of voters who had received a
payment from the Kuomintang voted for a different candidate,
despite the efforts of an organized and well-funded vote-buying
machine. Motivating large numbers of voters to support the ruling
party in one district in that election could cost as much as $4
million, not including payments to brokers (Wang and Kurzman,
2007). A survey of Nigerian voters found a similar result, with a
plurality of respondents saying they would accept a payment but
vote for the candidate of their choice (Bratton, 2008). This problem
does not diminish with scale: a study of Costa Rica's elections in the
first half of the twentieth century found that a major vote-buying
effort in a presidential election could cost as much as twenty
percent of a candidate's budget (Lehoucq and Molina, 2002, pp.
159; 169; Lehoucq, 2007). The ‘leakiness’ of extra-legal mobiliza-
tion represents a real loss of resources, and risks not generating
enough votes to win the election.
Compared to the networks of brokers and voters associatedwith
extra-legal mobilization, election fraud and ballot stuffing require
the cooperation of a relatively small number of easily-monitored
officials. In Russia, the case studied here, election commissions at
the national, regional, sub-regional, and precinct levels are
responsible for counting, tabulating and releasing election results.
The number of voting members of these commissions ranges from
three in the smallest precincts to sixteen in the largest (Central
Election Commission, 2009). An observation report of the 2011
legislative election in Russia noted ‘an informal link between
election officials and the state apparatus, which was affiliated with
the governing party in the majority of regions observed’ (OSCE,
2012). Golosov (2011) writes that the regional administrations
‘have gained complete control over the system of regional electoral
commissions,’ and describes this relationship as a ‘well-functioning
hierarchy’ that links the incomes and career prospects of rank-and-
file electoral workers, regional bureaucrats, and regional governors
to the electoral success of the ruling party (p. 637). Regional
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United Russia, which they in turn demand that their subordinates
in the electoral bureaucracy produce (White, 2011). Similar linkages
between the ruling party and the electoral administration have
been noted by observers in other post-communist countries (Bader,
2012; OSCE, 2011; OSCE, 2010; OSCE, 2013).
Election commissioners working on behalf of a party or candi-
date can falsify election protocols, inflating or deflating vote-totals
as necessary. They can also stuff ballot boxes themselves, or turn a
blind eye when others do so. In authoritarian countries, coercing or
co-opting precinct officials is relatively straightforward: electoral
commissions can be dominated by the ruling party, and judicial
punishment for electoral malfeasance is likely to be rare (Magaloni,
2010; Popova, 2006). Under such conditions, large numbers of pro-
government votes can be manufactured (or opposition votes dis-
carded) at relatively low cost. Neither election fraud nor ballot
stuffing necessarily involves direct contact with voters.
Election fraud and ballot stuffing rely on small networks of
election officials, while extra-legal mobilization requires large
networks that reach all the way to individual voters (and are prone
to principal-agent problems). The two former strategies are more
cost-effective and reliable ways to generate votes, so long as com-
mission members can be controlled (which appears to generally be
the case in Russia). If patrons and brokers choose to engage in
extra-legal mobilization, then, it must have additional benefits
beyond the ability to deliver clients to the voting booth.
2.2. Extra-legal mobilization as investment in (de)mobilizing
networks
Extra-legal mobilization efforts require investments in net-
works that link patrons, clients and brokers in support of the ruling
party. Authoritarian governments can use these networks to
motivate voters during elections and increase the likelihood of a
regime victory. However, such networks also provide authoritarian
governments with a tool for mobilizing supporters and demobi-
lizing opponents in the event of street protests. This benefit of
extra-legal mobilizationdas an insurance policy against opposition
action in the streetdis most valuable in places where the opposi-
tion has the capacity to organize such action.
Clientelist networks have traditionally been thought of as a
demobilizing influence, whereby patrons wield their influence to
make clients' collective action less likely (Rock, 1972; O'Donnell,
1992; Holzner, 2007). This demobilizing effect can be useful dur-
ing elections by encouraging opposing voters to abstain (Gans-
Morse et al., 2014; Cox and Kousser, 1981; Schaffer, 2002), but
can also have a broader effect by limiting opportunities for anti-
regime action on the part of clients (Fox, 1994; Grzymala-Busse,
2008; Wintrobe, 2000). The ability to demobilize clients is only
one possibility, however. Recently, researchers have recognized the
role such networks can have in mobilizing clients to demonstrate
active support for patrons outside the voting booth.
Auyero et al. (2009) provide evidence of patrons using their
networks to mobilize clients in political activity (both violent and
nonviolent), in pursuit of goals beyond electoral success. In their
cases, clients were mobilized to blockade major highways, loot
small businesses, and even burn down part of a poor neighborhood
to send a message about territorial control. Patronage networks
have also been found to be important in mobilizing contentious
action in Indonesia (Kalyvas, 2003), Colombia (Schmidt, 1974), and
Japan (Broadbent, 1999). As Auyero et al. (2009, p. 12) write, ‘Well-
functioning patronage networks can be purposively activated to
conduct politics by other collective (and sometimes violent)means’.
Patronage networks have also been used to promote non-
electoral collective action in Russia. Russia's regional governorshave considerable access to patronage resources (Hale, 2007;
Stoner-Weiss, 1999), and often mobilized their clients in protests
aimed at Moscow during the 1990s (Robertson, 2011). Unifying the
elite and bringing regional patronage networks under the Kremlin's
control was consequently a priority of the Putin administration
from its earliest days (see Reuter, 2010; Robertson, 2011, Colton and
McFaul, 2003). In response to anti-government protests in 2005,
Russian authorities relied on these networks to stage pro-
government demonstrations in cities across the country. In Mos-
cow, 20,000 turned out in support of Putin and the ruling party. One
employee of the city sanitation department in attendance told a
journalist that he and his fellow workers had been told to attend
and bring five to ten others. ‘When the boss asks such things, there
is no question of whether to go or not. Everyone has a family to
feed,’ (Kommersant February 14, 2005). These examples illustrate
how the same networks can be used to engage in or deter collective
action, and to provide electoral support for incumbents.
It might be objected that some forms of extra-legal mobilization
do not require the construction of durable patronage networks. A
voter who is rewarded one time for supporting the ruling party, but
is not embedded in a long-term clientelistic relationship, would not
appear to susceptible to pressure outside of that particular election.
Two responses can be offered to this objection. First, though the
relationship between brokers and voters may in some cases be
ephemeral, the relationship between patrons and brokers is not.
Brokers, furthermore, are most effective when they have detailed
knowledge of the territory for which they are responsible. Vote-
buying campaigns require brokers with intimate knowledge of
local populations: whose support can be bought, who can be
trusted, and what the community's material demands are. A broker
in charge of a particular territory must be ‘a walking encyclopedia
of local knowledge’ (Wang and Kurzman, 2007). Using patronage to
motivate voters is one way of locating and investing in successful
brokers and maintaining their links to the community as a whole
(Lust, 2009), even if connections to some individual voters are
tenuous. This kind of expertise can be used to mobilize or demo-
bilize clients in a crisis. Second, one-shot transactions do not appear
to be the most common expression of extra-legal mobilization.
Even when voters are provided with discrete benefits like cash or
food for votes, such exchanges are more often couched in ‘webs of
exchange, obligation, and reciprocity sustained over a longer
period, in which patrons provide private goods or club goods to
their clients’ (Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007).
2.3. Patronage networks as signaling devices
Conducting extra-legal mobilization requires investments in
patronage networks. Elections provide an opportunity to display
the strength of these networks: using patronage networks to
deliver votes shows that the incumbent regime has resources and
organizational capacity that can be used to thwart opposition ac-
tivity (electoral or otherwise). Awareness of this capacity helps
induce ambitious politicians to cooperate with the ruling party
rather than the opposition (Magaloni, 2006), an effect which re-
duces the likelihood of divisions within the elite that can lead to
mass protest (Hale, 2006; Hess, 2010). Extra-legal mobilization is
one way of indicating to career-minded politicians that siding with
the ruling party is a winning bet.
A broader informational view of election fraud holds that
excessive or blatant manipulation provides information on the
strength of the regime to a variety of actors, including voters,
candidates, bureaucrats, and more (Simpser, 2013). In this view,
these actors are more likely to take actions that support the regime
when they perceive it to be strong and durable. Electoral manipu-
lation that is excessive or blatant communicates that the regime is
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come or punish opponents, reward supporters, and circumvent the
law’ (Simpser, 2013, p. 6). If this view is correct, extra-legal mobi-
lization efforts should be a more compelling signal of ‘resources,
capacities, and inclinations’ than election fraud, since the former
requires much more significant investments in patronage net-
works. Activating patronage networks to win votes during an
election can have the additional, indirect benefit of convincing
actors within and outside the regime to cooperate with
incumbents.
2.4. Extra-legal mobilization and opposition capacity
Extra-legal mobilization thus has two indirect benefits, beyond
improving the ruling party's chance of winning an election: it
builds patronage networks, and sends signals about the strength of
these networks to other political actors. As a result, I expect extra-
legal mobilization to become more common and intense in places
where the value of these benefits exceeds the considerable
resource costs it requires. The value of both benefits increases along
with the capacity of the opposition to mobilize its own supporters.
Organized opposition forces are well understood to be a threat
to authoritarian government (Rueschemeyer et al., 1992; Collier,
1999; Diamond, 1999). Organized opposition groups can instigate
mass protest (Bratton and Van de Walle, 1997, Beissinger, 2002;
Thompson and Kuntz, 2004; Tucker, 2007) that can be destabiliz-
ing. Where ‘political and civic organizations [develop] a capacity to
mobilize citizens’ to protest and compete in elections, authoritarian
governments are at risk of collapse unless they can mobilize their
own corresponding resources (Levitsky and Way, 2010).
Consequently, we should expect to see authoritarian govern-
ments invest more heavily in pro-regime patronage networks in
regions where the opposition is more capable of mobilizing sup-
porters, in order to counteract possible opposition activity. For
example, as the capacity of the opposition to stage protests in-
creases, the ability to use a countervailing patronage network to
mobilize supporters in response (or demobilize important classes
of citizens, e.g. industrial workers) becomes more important.
Where an organized opposition presents a genuine career alter-
native for politicians, a sizeable extra-legal mobilization effort can
signal to such actors that the regime's ability to influence elections
is backed up by considerable organizational resources. Falsifying
election returns or stuffing ballot boxes are less effective at
providing these additional benefits, since these tactics do not
require the construction of large networks that link incumbent
patrons to citizens. However, in regions where opposition groups
are lightly organized (or not at all), extra-legal mobilization pro-
vides little benefit relative to its cost.
Hypothesis 1. Extra-legal mobilization efforts should be more
intense in places where opposition groups are more capable of
mobilizing supporters.2.5. Electoral falsification, ballot stuffing, and competitiveness
To fully test the above claims, it is necessary to understand how
other forms of electoral manipulation respond to local competi-
tiveness. Falsifying election protocols and stuffing ballot boxes with
false ballots both improve the chances that their beneficiary will
win the election. However, since they do not involve actual voters,
these strategies are not useful for building mobilizational networks
in competitive regions. While the relationship between these two
strategies is not the main focus of this article, the same logic of
competitiveness that influences extra-legal mobilization also af-
fects falsification and ballot stuffing. As discussed below,falsification is expected where competition is lowest, while ballot
stuffing should occur at middle ranges of competitiveness.
Falsification involves election officials reporting false results on
election protocols. Successful falsification requires that officials
engage in a criminal activity that could be easily traced back to
them personally if exposed, since a sizeable gap between official
results and the number of ballots cast can only be explained by
malfeasance on the part of the election commissioner. In some
cases in the 2011 Russian election, observers were able to record
unofficial copies of the election protocol before the final version
was released. In one case, published by Golos (2011), the pre-
liminary protocol from a precinct in Dagestan shows only 174 total
votes (mostly for United Russia). However, in the official results,
United Russia received 1077 votes. Election tampering on this scale
is only feasible if officials feel that exposure and punishment is
highly unlikelydthat is, if the ruling party has consolidated its
control over the region.
Hypothesis 2. Election falsification will decrease as political
competitiveness increases.
Ballot stuffing is a less risky strategy than outright falsification,
since the results are tied to actual ballots (though not actual voters).
An election commissioner might look the other way as an agent
drops a handful of ballots in the urn (or even do the stuffing him-
self), but nothing ties the commissioner or the state directly to the
manipulation once the deed is done. The strategy is feasible at
higher levels of competitiveness as a result. Yet it is still less efficient
than falsification, since ballots must be procured and distributed to
agents (who must be compensated in some way), and agents can
only stuff a few ballots at a time. Finally, since it does not involve
large patronage networks, ballot-stuffing does not provide the in-
direct benefits of extra-legal mobilization. As a result, ballot-stuffing
should increase with competitiveness, but not monotonically. Ballot
stuffing should become more common as falsification becomes
difficult, butdsince ballot stuffing lacks indirect benefits that
become more valuable at high levels of competitivenessdshould
not increase continuously as competitiveness rises.
Hypothesis 3. Ballot stuffing should become more common as
competitiveness increases until the middle range, and then remain
stable.
These three hypotheses are based on the theory that different
election manipulation tactics carry different costs and benefits.
Falsification is most cost-effective, but requires a high level of unity
among political actors. Ballot stuffing requires less political unity,
but is less cost-efficient. Finally, extra-legal mobilization is least
cost-efficient, but provides additional non-electoral benefits
beyond ballot stuffing by building and displaying organizational
strength. While I do not directly test the claim that the same people
induced by extra-legal mobilization are mobilized for pro-
government rallies, it is well-known that such networks are used
to mobilize and demobilize citizens. Instead, I test the claim that
these networks are most likely to be employed in extra-legal
mobilization at election time in competitive regions.3. Research design
To test these hypotheses, I draw on the results of the 2011 parlia-
mentary election in Russia. The dataset consists of over 94,000
precinct-level returns, nested within 83 regions. I adapt existing
electoral forensic methods to estimate measures of extra-legal
mobilization, falsification, and ballot stuffing from this data. A
multilevel model is used to test the relationship between these esti-
mates and threemeasures of the opposition's organizational capacity.
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with which to test the theory described above. First, contemporary
Russia is an archetypal hybrid regime, where elections are the only
legitimate route to political power, but are heavily managed. Sec-
ond, the political system is hierarchical (Hale, 2010; Reuter, 2010),
and regional leaders must deliver votes for the ruling party or run
the risk of dismissal (Reuter and Robertson, 2012). In addition,
Russia's regions vary considerably in terms of average per capita
income, ethnic makeup, and other socio-economic factors. Finally,
despite the high degree of political centralization, there is consid-
erable variation in the level of partisan competition across the
country, with the ruling party's degree of support in the 2011
election ranging from 40 to 99 percent. The hierarchical nature of
Russian federalism, combined with the diversity of its regions,
means that a subnational analysis allows holds constant many
historical and institutional factors, while still allowing for results
that can be generalized.
3.1. Measuring extra-legal mobilization and ballot stuffing
Russian electoral law allows citizens to cast an absentee ballot
away from their assigned polling place, making multiple voting
easier to accomplish. It can also provide brokers with a means of
monitoring their clients' voting behavior, if voting takes place
outside the polling place. Reports from Golos, the premier non-
governmental election-monitoring organization in Russia, contain
numerous examples of such behavior. Golos (2011) reports that ‘A
large number of reports concerned coercion to obtain absentee
ballots,’ and described numerous examples of the abuse of the
absentee provision. A representative example is reproduced here.3
‘On December 2, the director [of a construction company]
brought together the staff and announced that Saturday would
be a day off, but that Sunday [Election Day] would be a working
day. All were instructed to obtain absentee ballots on Saturday
and to vote at the workplacedstrictly for United Russia, under
penalty of dismissal (Nizhny Novgorod).’
The absentee ballot enables the leaders of firms and institutions
to compel their subordinates to vote en masse and under their
supervision. Another tactic is described in a report to Golos:
‘In the group were ten people; they paid them ten thousand
rubles [approximately $300 at the time] so that, on election day,
having received absentee ballots, they would ride around in a
special car to 37 polling places and vote for United Russia…And
this is not the only such voting group!’
As the example illustrates, the absentee ballot helps facilitate so-
called ‘carousel’ voting, where United Russia voters are shuttled
from one polling place to another. Since the principal advantage of
the absentee ballot as a tool for manipulation is its connection to an
actual voter, I use the share of voters voting by absentee in a pre-
cinct to construct a measure of extra-legal mobilization.
A large percentage of absentee votes does not itself indicate
extra-legal mobilization. Rather, it is the relationship between the
percentage of absentee votes and the percentage support for United
Russia that is telling. I propose a modification of the measure used
by Myagkov et al. (2009), in which a regression coefficient is
calculated that relates overall turnout to support for a party. A large,
positive coefficient may be suggestive of manipulation using this
approach, but since it relies on overall turnout it cannot distinguish3 Translations by the author.between different types of manipulation. Replacing overall turnout
with the percentage of absentee votes focuses on extra-legal voter
mobilization, while excluding forms of manipulation that do not
rely on the absentee ballot. Since the absentee ballot is mainly a tool
for vote-buying and voter intimidation, I use a multi-level regres-
sion model, described below, to generate estimates of extra-legal
mobilization for each of Russia's 83 regions. In a region where
extra-legal mobilization is an important aspect of the regime's
electoral strength, I expect to see a positive correlation between the
percentage of absentee votes and percentage support for United
Russia at the precinct level. The larger the coefficient of this
regression, the larger the share of absentee votes that went to
United Russia, indicating a more intense extra-legal mobilization
effort.
The same process is used to estimate the intensity of ballot-
stuffing efforts, using ballots cast by mobile ballot box in place of
absentee voting in themultilevel model. Russian law permits voters
who are unable to leave their homes to request that a ballot box be
brought to them on election day. Removing the ballot box from the
polling place, however, gives officials the opportunity to stuff it
with forged ballots. Overall, Golos found that mobile ballot boxes
were kept away from observers in 13 percent of monitored pre-
cincts. In 23 percent of monitored precincts, election officials did
not announce the number of applicants for mobile voting before
the mobile boxes were opened and the results tallied (Golos, 2011).
Two examples from Golos describe the process.
The chair of the [electoral] commission did not announce the
beginning of the mobile voting, or show the register [of mobile
voters]. Afterward, 296 people were on the list, which is too
many for voting at home. All 296 peoplewere visited in 1.5 hours.
They refused to show the mobile ballot box to observers
following mobile voting. They took the urn to another floor and
closed it in an office.
International observers reported similar problems in a majority
of approximately 1500 observed polling places (OSCE, 2012). Mo-
bile votesmake up an increasingly large portion of the electorate. In
2011, mobile votes accounted for 6.6% of votes cast, the most of any
Duma election, while absentee voting accounted for just shy of two
percent of total votes (Golos, 2011).
I do not claim that all votes cast by absentee or the mobile ballot
box are fraudulent; certainly legitimate voters may make use of
these tools. Nor do I argue that these measures capture all efforts to
mobilize voters or stuff ballot boxes. These measures do not cover
instances where individuals are pressured to cast a standard vote at
their own polling place, or when an agent drops a handful of ballots
into the stationary ballot box. However, I do argue that a positive
correlation between absentee or mobile voting and the ruling-
party's vote share can be taken as an indicator of these types of
manipulationdapproaches which have been frequently noted by
election observers.
Finally, thesemeasures are not perfect. In some cases the mobile
ballot box will be used to pressure voters, by appearing to give
officials or employers the ability to violate the secret ballot. In some
cases, absentee ballots may be used to stuff ballot boxes. However,
any blending of this sort should make it more difficult to distin-
guish any empirical differences between the two measures. That is,
the imperfection of the measures makes the empirical test used
here more difficult, rather than easier.3.2. Digits tests and falsification of results
Finally, it is necessary to measure falsification by election
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tampering with election returns by officials leaves detectable traces
as a result. In an electionwhere no post-hoc rigging takes place, the
distribution of trailing digits in the totals for each party should be
uniform across all precincts. That is, the one's digit for a particular
party's vote total in a given district is a random product of that
precinct's voters' idiosyncratic decisions to vote. Each digit from
0 to 9 should occur in approximately 10 percent of precincts (Beber
and Scacco, 2012).
The probability that an underlying uniform population distri-
bution would produce a non-uniform sample distribution due to
chance can be ascertained using a chi-square test. To score falsifi-
cation in this study, I conducted chi-square tests of uniformity for
trailing digits of the vote totals of the four parties that won seats in
the Duma in 2011, in each of Russia's 83 regions. This information
was used to create a variable, Fraud score, which ranges from 0 to 4.4
Each region received a point on this scale for each party that
returned a p-value of less than .05 in the chi-square test.3.3. Control variables
The misuse of absentee voting and the mobile ballot box in the
2011 election has been documented by observers, which provides
an important justification for using the measures given above. In
the more general sense, however, absentee and mobile votes are
simply special forms of turnout. These votes are not drawn from the
population as a whole, however, but from subsetsdpeople who are
ostensibly away from their home polling place (absentee ballots), or
unable to reach the polling place (mobile ballot box). As a result,
analyzing the relationship between these types of votes and United
Russia's share of the vote requires the use of control variables.
Ideally such control variables would be found at the precinct
level. Unfortunately such precise data do not exist; consequently all
of the control and explanatory variables used in this study are taken
at the regional level. These regional-level variables will help explain
variation between regions, but notwithin them. This is appropriate,
since regional variation in the relationship between absentee/mo-
bile voting and support for the ruling party is the question of
interest.
The mobile ballot box is primarily meant to be used by the
elderly and by those in hospitals. Consequently, I include the con-
trol variable Pensioners in the model. This variable is the number of
pensioners in each region, per 1000 residents, as of 2010 (Russian
State Statistical Service, 2012. Hereafter, RSSS, 2012). The pen-
sioners variable does double duty, since the elderly are also more
likely to find themselves in hospitals on election day.
No data is available on what types of voters might be more in-
clined to vote by absentee in the Russian context. However, studies
of the United States have shown statistically significant effects for
age and level of education on propensity to vote by absentee, along
with income (Barreto et al., 2006; Dubin and Kalsow, 1996; Karp
and Banducci, 2001). Old age is captured by the Pensioners vari-
able described above. Education is measured using the variable
Higher Education, which is the number of people in each regionwho
have completed tertiary education, per 1000 population (2010
Russian Census).5 Per capita income is the average income of each
region in rubles as of 2010 (RSSS, 2012).
I also control for those factors that have been identified as4 As a robustness check, I also used a dichotomous variable, which equals 1 if any
party's electoral data was suspiciously non-uniform. The results of this approach
are substantively similar to the results found using Fraud score.
5 Specifically, the Russian degrees of ‘bakalavr,’ ‘spetsialist,’ and ‘magistr’ as of
2010.important in the literature on vote-buying and clientelism. Poverty,
low education, and low economic development have all been
identified as factors that can make an individual more susceptible
to vote-buying appeals (Brusco et al., 2004; Kitschelt and
Wilkinson, 2007). I therefore include a measure of Poverty, the
percentage of citizens with incomes falling below the official
poverty line, along with the higher education variable described
above (RSSS, 2012).
Monitoring voters' actions is easiest in small, densely-knit
communities (Stokes, 2005). In polities with large populations,
the political machine must not only deploy more resources to
purchase a relevant share of votes, but must also monitor voters
across larger, more diffuse networks (Hicken, 2011). To account for
this, I include each region's Population in thousands (RSSS, 2012).
Additionally, the structure of the economy can influence both the
susceptibility of voters and the ease of monitoring by brokers. Large
public sectors provide government officials with resources to
distribute and the ability to directly oversee a large swath of voters
(Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007). The same can be said of economic
concentration generally. The more centralized an economy is, the
more influence particular industries may be able to wield over their
employees (Hale, 2007). I include two variables to control for these
effects. The variable Government Employment reflects the number of
regional and municipal government employees in each region per
10,000 residents (RSSS, 2012). Economic Concentration is con-
structed using statistical data that reports the percentage share of
regional economies attributed to each of fifteen economic sectors:
agriculture, mining, manufacturing, retail, and so on (RSSS, 2012).
The variable is the sum of the squares of those percentages.6
I also include two variables to control for the availability of
media in each region. The Newspaper variable refers to the number
of copies of newspapers published per 1000 residents (RSSS, 2012)
while the variable Internet measures the percentage of surveyed
organizations in each region that reported regular use of the
Internet (RSSS, 2012).7
The last control is a measure of Agricultural Employment, the
percentage of the regional population employed in agriculture in
2010 (RSSS, 2012). Agricultural communities are often small,
dependent on state-provided goods and services, and economically
isolated. As such, Hale (2007) argues that in Russia ‘the most
electorally powerful gubernatorial machines [can be found] in
those regions with the greatest shares of the workforces employed
in agriculture.’ Insofar as high levels of agricultural employment
indicate dependence on the state, it should limit the capacity of
opposition supporters to successfully mobilize. Extra-legal mobi-
lization should decline as the proportion of the population engaged
in agriculture increases. However, agricultural employment also
helps control for a possible confounding factor. Mobile voting is
likely to be more common in rural areas; if rural voters are also
more inclined to vote for United Russia, then this combination
might skew the measure upward in rural regions. Agricultural
employment is thus an essential control.3.4. Explanatory variables
The theory described here predicts that extra-legal mobilization
is more likely to occur in places where the opposition has a higher
capacity to mobilize supporters in collective action, and that other6 This is analogous to the Herfindahl index used in economics and other fields to
evaluate the degree of competition among firms in an industry.
7 Though this last variable is somewhat esoteric, and serves as proxy for the
general population's connectedness to the internet, it is the best available option.
Other estimates of internet access are not available at the regional level.
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difficult to measure such a concept directly. As a result, I use three
different empirical measures of the explanatory variable. Two of
these measure electoral mobilization, while the third is a socio-
economic proxy variable. A fourth variable, expert assessments of
political openness in the regions, is used in the appendix as a
robustness check with supportive results.
While no individual measure perfectly captures the concept,
supportive results along all three of the measures used should
improve confidence that the theory correctly explains why extra-
legal mobilization is employed in some places and not others. The
first electoral measure is United Russia's margin of victory in the
2011 parliamentary election. This variable, UR Margin of Victory, is
simply United Russia's percentage support in each regionminus the
percentage support of its closest competitor. Since extra-legal
mobilization is theorized to be a response to the opposition's
ability to mobilize, extra-legal mobilization should be greater in
close contests rather than lopsided ones.
The second electoral measure is regional competitiveness, which
is defined as the difference between the vote-share of the ruling
party and the vote-share of the second-place party in the most
recent regional legislative election. In all cases the runner-up was
the Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF), the prin-
cipal opposition party in Russia (Gel'man 2008). The difference
between the two parties is then subtracted from one, so that a high
score indicates a higher degree of opposition activity. A better
showing for the KPRF in the regional election is taken as evidence of
a greater ability to mobilize voters, which can indicate opposition
unity (Howard and Roessler, 2006), the unpopularity of the regional
governor or his/her inability to politically unite regional elites
(Reuter, 2013) or the articulation of local issues (Golosov, 2006). I
use vote-share rather than seat-share since Russia's regions use a
variety of mixed and proportional-representation electoral systems
that can vary in how they translate votes to seats (Panov and Ross,
2013). Higher competitiveness scores should be associated with
greater extra-legal mobilization activity.
Readers may be concerned that both of these measure, being
derived from electoral competition (albeit at different levels), are
endogenous to the phenomenon of interest. I hope to address this
concern as follows. First, recall that the dependent variable of in-
terest in this model is not United Russia's raw vote-share. In other
words, the model does not ask whether extra-legal mobilization
improves United Russia's showing in elections. Instead, the
dependent variable is the size of the relationship between absentee
(or mobile) votes and United Russia's support in each region. It is
possible that extra-legal mobilization could be more intensive in
regions with high margins of victory for United Russia, but it is also
possible that such a strategy might be only employed in places
where the party's position is precarious (as predicted here).
Second, I include a non-electoral measure of opposition capacity
that can be used to confirm the results of the electoral variables:
Percent Russian, the percentage of the regional population made up
of ethnic Russians (Russian Census, 2010). This is a plausible proxy
for opposition capacity in the Russian context. Since the early days
of the Soviet Union, minority ethnicity has been politicized by the
central government. From the 1920s, the Soviet government
recognized ethnic homelands within the Russian Soviet Republic.
Ethnic elites were promoted into leadership positions in the
regional party, government, industries, and schools. Minority
ethnic identity was reinforced through officially-promoted sym-
bols: national museums, folklore, art, music, and literature (Martin,
2001, pp 9e17).
These titular ethnic regions are among the most devoted to
United Russia in the present period (Hale, 2007). As a result of the
Putin administration's extensive efforts to subdue the regions andbring them under the authority of the Kremlin (Konitzer and
Wegren, 2006), the assets that make political machines in the
ethnic territories so powerfuldstocks of local political resources, a
shared collective identity, and relatively unified elites (Ross 2000;
Treisman 1997)dwere put in the service of the center. Regions
where ethnic Russians predominate allow more political space for
opposition activity, while ethnic minority enclaves tend to be
politically unified around United Russia. I expect extra-legal
mobilization to be rare in Russia's ethnic enclaves for two related
reasons: first, the regional political machines in such enclaves are
strong enough to deter most competition, and second, the central
government has been able to co-opt the machine's pre-existing
networks for electoral benefit. In regions where politicized mi-
nority ethnicity does not provide a ready-made network, elites are
more likely to rely on extra-legal mobilization.
The theory discussed above implies an uncertain relationship
between extra-legal mobilization and actual protest by the oppo-
sition. The risk of pro-opposition collective action should be
elevated in places where the opposition has a greater ability to
mobilize supporters (McCarthy and Zald, 1977). However, if the
regime is able to construct patronage networks and utilize them to
win elections in such places, the theory predicts these networks
should act as a deterrent on opposition mobilization by signaling
the organizational strength of the regime and de-mobilizing some
citizens. In other words, extra-legal mobilization should be
employed in places where there is a high risk of opposition activity
(which would imply a positive correlation), but should also serve to
deter protest (a negative correlation). Consequently, measures of
actual protest are not appropriate statistical tests for this theory,
and proxies that measure opposition capacity are used instead.
All three variables capture a wide degree of variation. United
Russia's margin of victory in 2011 ranges from one percentage point
to ninety-nine. Regional competitiveness ranges from .15 at the
least competitive extreme, to .93 at the most. Finally, Russian
ethnicity ranges from approximately 1% to 97% of the population,
though most regions are dominated by ethnic Russians.
3.5. Multilevel model of electoral manipulation
I test this theory using a multilevel model to estimate the effect
of the explanatory variables on extra-legal mobilization and ballot-
stuffing efforts. The ability to account for hierarchical clusters and
to analyze contextual effects across clusters are two of the strengths
of multilevel modeling (Steenbergen and Jones, 2002). The esti-
mation occurs in two steps, corresponding to the two levels of the
model. At the first level, United Russia's percentage support in each
precinct i in region j is modeled as a function of the percentage of
absentee (or mobile) votes in that precinct. This produces a
regression coefficient b for each region j that describes the rela-
tionship between absentee (or mobile) voting and support for
United Russia there. The larger the coefficient, the more intense the
manipulation effort is taken to be. The 83 b coefficients generated
by the first level of the model form the dependent variable at the
second level. They are modeled as a function of the control and
explanatory variables described above, which produces a vector of
regression coefficients F. The F coefficients indicate the relation-
ship between the region-level variables and the precinct-level
relationship between nonstandard voting and United Russia sup-
port, and are therefore the figures of greatest interest here. The
model takes the following form.
yij ¼ aj þ bjzij þ ei (1)
bj ¼ F0 þ FXj þ ebj (2)
Table 1
Multilevel models of the relationship between absentee voting (extra-legal mobilization) and United Russia vote-share, abbreviated. Coefficients are predictors of extra-legal
mobilization estimates. Standard errors in parentheses.* ¼ p < .1; ** ¼ p < .05; *** ¼ p < .01.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5
UR margin .98*** (.26)
Russian .70** (.27)
Competitive .73** (.24)
Fraud score .17*** (.04)
Log. pop .23** (.12) .23** (.11) .28** (.12) .24** (.11) .23** (.11)
Log. inc. .06 (.36) .30 (.32) .15 (.34) .04 (.34) .04 (.33)
Poverty .49 (1.42) 2.16 (1.3) .98 (1.35) 1.34 (1.37) 1.56 (1.34)
Gov. emp. .53** (.27) .41* (.22) .49** (.23) .49** (.22) .50** (.22)
Pension .44** (.16) .04 (.15) .10 (.18) .26* (.15) .20 (.15)
Concentration .17 (.87) .08 (.77) .32 (.82) .08 (.83) .20 (.8)
Internet .55 (.61) .19 (.53) .64 (.58) .51 (.58) .48 (.55)
Higher education .08 (.17) .06 (.15) .10 (.16) .11 (.16) .09 (.15)
Newspapers .01 (.00) .00 (.00) .01 (.00) .01 (.00) .01 (.00)
Ag. employment .02 (.01) .017 (.01) .015 (.01) .01 (.01) .01 (.01)
(Intercept) 2.83 (.49) .03 (.22) 1.21 (.47) 1.71 (.4) 1.87 (.52)
Percent absentee 1.72 (1.43) 3.16 (1.65) 1.16 (.174) .34 (1.74) .79 (1.68)
Group-level variance .02 .002 .01 .01 .02
Individual variance .03 .03 .03 .03 .03
Intraclass corr. .4 .07 .25 .25 .4
AIC 79,820 80,014 79,871 79,900 79,849
BIC 79,575 79,750 79,606 79,655 79,585
Log likelihood 39,936 40,033 39,964 39,976 39,953
Number of obs. 94,688
Number of groups 83
Table 2
Multilevel models of the relationship betweenmobile voting (ballot-stuffing) and United Russia vote-share, abbreviated. Coefficients are predictors of ballot-stuffing estimates.
Standard errors in parentheses.* ¼ p < .1; ** ¼ p < .05; *** ¼ p < .01.
Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10
UR margin .76 (.48)
UR margin2 1.59 (.57)**
Russian ethnicity 1.82 (.65)**
Russian2 1.26 (.54)*
Competitiveness 2.68 (.83)***
Competitiveness2 2.05 (.68)**
Fraud score .13(.03)***
Log. pop. .11 (.07) .09 (.07) .09 (.07) .12 (.07) .1 (.06)
Log. inc. .33 (.22) .6 (.21)** .51 (.22)* .52 (.22)* .33 (.2)
Poverty .81 (.9) .12 (.86) .24 (.87) .25 (.86) .09 (.82)
Gov. employment .09 (.11) .1 (.1) .08 (.1) .11 (.1) .09 (.1)
Pension .12 (.1) .1 (.11) .05 (.13) .05 (.1) .07 (.1)
Concentration .75 (.55) .83 (.51) .77 (.52) .81 (.52) .44 (.5)
Internet .42 (.41) .59 (.37) .5 (.39) .26 (.38) .48 (.36)
Higher education .04 (.12) .03 (.1) .02 (.11) .05 (.1) .02 (.1)
Newspapers .00 (.00) .00 (.00) .00 (.00) .00 (.00) .00 (.00)
Ag. employment .02 (.001) .02 (.01)** .02 (.01)* .02 (.01)* .01 (.01)
(Intercept) 2.2 (.64) .22 (.21) .88 (.49) 1.46 (.36) 1.63 (.51)
Percent mobile 1.33 (1.17) 3.7 (1.2)*** 2.41 (1.15)* 1.62 (1.1) 2.23 (1.07)
Group-level variance .02 .002 .01 .01 .02
Individual variance .02 .02 .02 .02 .02
Intraclass corr. .5 .09 .33 .33 .5
AIC 86,924 87,137 86,978 87,021 86,968
BIC 86,678 86,853 86,694 86,737 86,703
Log likelihood 43,488 43,598 43,519 43,540 43,512
Number of obs. 94,688
Number of groups 83
8 A ‘full’ model that includes all main explanatory variables is not presented here
due to multicollinearity concerns. The full model is provided in the appendix.
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Table 1 presents the results of five models that test the rela-
tionship between extra-legal mobilization and the variables
described above. Table 2 shows the results for ballot-stuffing as the
dependent variable. The coefficients in both tables are the F terms,
which describe a relationship between the variable listed and the
manipulation estimates generated at the first level of the model.
The first model in each table provides a baseline where only controlvariables are included.8 The next three models each include one of
the three measures of opposition capacity. The last model in each
table uses fraud score to test the relationship between falsification
and the other two forms ofmanipulation. In all cases the addition of
the explanatory variable improves the log-likelihood, AIC, and BIC
Fig. 1. United Russia's margin of victory and severity of extra-legal mobilization (Model 2).
Fig. 2. United Russia's margin of victory and severity of ballot-stuffing (Model 7).
C.J. Harvey / Electoral Studies 41 (2016) 105e117 113relative to the base model. Taken together, the results of these
models make a strong case that ballot stuffing replaces falsification
as competitiveness increases, but its use tapers off at high levels of
competitiveness. By contrast, extra-legal mobilization efforts in-
crease in a linear fashion as competitiveness rises.9
The results are presented graphically in Figs. 1e8. In each, the
points represent a region. The point's value on the y-axis represents
the value of the extra-legal mobilization estimate (or ballot-stuffing
estimate) for that region. The vertical bars represent 95% confi-
dence intervals around each estimate. The solid line illustrates the9 Russian ethnicity and competitiveness are not significant when square terms
are used to model extra-legal mobilization. Linear terms for margin of victory and
Russian ethnicity are significant when are used to model ballot-stuffing, however
the curvilinear models better fit the data according to the AIC and log-likelihood.
On the whole, linear models best explain extra-legal mobilization, while curvi-
linear models best explain ballot-stuffing.coefficient of the relevant variable from Table 1 or 2.10 The solid line
indicates how the effect of absentee or mobile voting on United
Russia's support changes across regions, as the value of the
explanatory variable changes.
Fig. 1 shows the relationship between United Russia's margin of
victory and extra-legal mobilization. The pattern clearly indicates
that this brand of electoral manipulation is employed in regions
where United Russia's margin of victory is narrow. In these regions,
opposition groups are able to genuinely contest the election, even if
the ruling party's ability to rely on patronage networks gives it a
distinct advantage. As the influence of opposition parties decreases,10 These figures convey more information than a traditional marginal effect plot,
which would use confidence bands to show the range of values for which an
interaction term is statistically significant. These figures illustrate the relationship
between an explanatory variable and the 83 separate marginal effects estimated for
each region, along with the uncertainty inherent in those estimates.
Fig. 3. Russian ethnicity and severity of extra-legal mobilization (Model 3).
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gests that in places where the ruling party faces little competition,
they do not undertake the expense of mobilizing voters in large
extra-legal mobilization efforts via patronage networks. By
contrast, as Fig. 2 shows, mobile voting appears hold steady when
United Russia's margin of victory is small or moderate, but declines
sharply as the margin widens. This suggests that ballot-stuffing is
used at similar levels when competition is modest or high, but
rarely when competition is low. By contrast, extra-legal mobiliza-
tion becomes increasingly prominent as competition increases.
A similar effect can be seenwhen ethnicity is used as a proxy for
openness to opposition activity. As shown in Figs. 3 and 4, absentee
voting has an increasing effect on United Russia's vote-share as the
percentage of ethnic Russians increases, while the effect of mobile
voting levels off. Minority enclaves in Russia offer little room for
parties to compete with United Russia. As predicted, very little
evidence of extra-legal mobilization is detected in regions where
ethnic Russians are a minority population. Where ethnic Russians
predominate, extra-legal mobilization appears much moreFig. 4. Russian ethnicity and severiintensive. Ballot stuffing, by contrast, is not more common in pre-
dominantly Russian regions than in ethnically mixed regions.
The Regional Competitiveness measure shows a similar rela-
tionship with extra-legal mobilization estimates (Fig. 5). Where
opposition parties generate few votes for the regional legislature,
extra-legal mobilization does not appear to be an important part of
election management for the ruling party. Extra-legal mobilization
becomes more common as the level of competitiveness rises,
where opposition parties are able to genuinely contest regional
elections. Ballot-stuffing, consistent with the previous models, is
most important at the middle range of competitiveness (Fig. 6).
Finally, Figs. 7 and 8 illustrate the relationship between falsifi-
cation and extra-legal mobilization and ballot-stuffing. In both
cases, the relationship is linear and negative. Falsification declines
steadily as ballot-stuffing and extra-legal mobilization are
employed more intensively.
Taken together, the measures employed here tell the same story.
There is strong evidence that falsification occurs predominantly in
places where pro-regime political machines are strongest. Regimety of ballot-stuffing (Model 8).
Fig. 5. Local competitiveness and severity of extra-legal mobilization (Model 4).
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feasible, due to increased competitive pressure. Ballot stuffing re-
mains part of the manipulation effort, but does not become more
intense at the highest levels of competitiveness. Extra-legal mobi-
lization, however, increases steadily as the threat of political
competition increases. These patterns can be seenwhen opposition
capacity to mobilize is measured directly using margins of victory
in national and regional elections, and when measured indirectly
using ethnicity as a proxy.
5. Conclusion
This paper began by identifying a puzzle that has gone largely
unremarked upon in the literature on election manipulation and
hybrid regimes. Extra-legal mobilization efforts are known to be
expensive and prone to agency loss and defection. As a result,
extra-legal mobilization runs the risk of not generating enough
votes to win the election. Why do governments in hybrid regimes
undertake these risks, and pay the high costs necessary toFig. 6. Local competitiveness and sevimplement extra-legal mobilization, when alternatives are avail-
able? Why not instead emphasize tampering with the vote count,
a process which requires monitoring fewer people and can provide
finely targeted election results? Or ballot stuffing, which can be
conducted when voters and observers are not present? Manipu-
lation of either sort could also be used to guarantee the slim
margins of victory that United Russia claimed in more competitive
regions.
To address this puzzle, I have argued that the mix of election
manipulation tactics employed varies in response to local political
competitiveness. Where competitiveness is very low, supporters of
the regime falsify election results. The cost of controlling election
commissions, the likelihood of the government's electoral defeat,
and the likelihood of anti-regime protest are all low in places where
opposition groups lack the ability to mobilize supporters. Ruling-
party elites and ambitious politicians already have strong in-
centives to stick with the ruling party rather than join a weak op-
position. With minimal indirect benefits from extra-legal
mobilization in such regions, direct falsification is preferred. Aserity of ballot-stuffing (Model 9).
Fig. 7. Fraud score and severity of extra-legal mobilization (Model 5).
Fig. 8. Fraud score and severity of ballot-stuffing (Model 10).
C.J. Harvey / Electoral Studies 41 (2016) 105e117116competition increases, falsification becomes less feasible and ballot
stuffing increases in importance. However, ballot stuffing does not
increase monotonically with competitiveness. Instead, in places
where opposition groups have a high capacity to mobilize, extra-
legal mobilization becomes an increasingly valuable part of the
ruling party's efforts.
Extra-legal mobilization requires investments in networks of
patronage that can be used to mobilize voters in the election at
hand, but can also be used to mobilize or demobilize clients when
necessary. Elections provide an opportunity to build, test and
display these networks. Effective use of extra-legal manipulation
sends signals about the organizational capacity of the ruling party,
which may influence how other political actors behave. The
mobilizing and signaling benefits of extra-legal mobilization in-
crease in value as opposition groups become more capable of
mobilizing their own supporters. In sum, local political competi-
tiveness structures the mix of tactics with which incumbents seek
to manipulate elections in hybrid regimes.Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data related to this article can be found at http://
dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2015.11.004.References
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